Cascading breakdown on complex networks has attracted much attention in recent years since people have realized the great danger brought by cascading failures in real life networks. In this study we propose a simple model describing cascading breakdown generated by the redistribution of packet loads by congested links on weighted scale-free networks. A collapsed link, which has lost its function as the medium for packet flows, is due to the overall quantity of flows through it exceeding its capacity, i.e. the maximal quantity of packet flows allowed on each link. In this model, a control parameter is adopted to portray the effects of the cascading breakdown on different weighted networks. We find that the most fragile links (i.e. links that collapse most easily) have different node degrees on both sides for different weighted network. We conclude that strengthening link weights (corresponding to upgrading of real life networks) using weight preferential strategy is beneficial to the prevention from large scale cascading breakdown on complex networks.
§1. Introduction
Complex network, a newly emerging subject, has attracted much attention in recent years. 1),2) People have found that many real-world networks, such as electrical power grids and the Internet, present network structure. In recent years, many properties of complex networks have been reported in the literature. Notably, it is found that many complex networks are scale-free, which means that the degree distributions of these networks follow a power-law form P (k) ∼ k −γ , where P (k) is the probability that a node in the network is connected to k other nodes and γ is a positive real number determined by the given network. In scale-free networks, few nodes have many neighbors, while most nodes have few direct connections with others. This leads to the fact that large-degree nodes play a significantly important role in these networks. The average shortest path lengths of these networks will not change much by the removal of a random subset of nodes, but it will increase significantly if the most connected nodes are removed. 3)− 6) Modelling the dynamics of physical flows over networks is a fascinating subject in the fields of complex networks. 1) This is because cascading breakdown on complex networks is a serious threat when nodes and links are sensitive to overloading. In a power transmission grid, for instance, each node deals with a load of power. Removal of nodes or links, in general, can cause redistribution of loads on the whole network, which can trigger a cascade of overloading failures. An example is the blackout of 11 US states and two Canadian provinces on the Aug. 10th 1996, 7) initially due to the sag of a 1,300-megawatt electrical line in southern Oregon. Another example is the Internet, where the load represents data packets and a node (router) is requested to transmit and overloading corresponds to congestion. 8) The rerouting of data packets from a congested router to another may spread the congestion to a large fraction of the network, as was reported in Ref. 9) . By now there have been several reports about cascading breakdown on complex networks. In Ref. 19) , the authors proposed the fiber bundle model on scale-free networks as a conceptual framework used to model cascading breakdown. By assuming that in the initial state the external force is equally distributed among all the nodes in the network so that each element bears a load and that the threshold values of loads obeys the Weibull distribution, they pointed out that in order to prevent cascading failures on scale-free networks, one has to find an optimal criterion that takes into account two factors: the robustness of the system itself under repeated failures and the possibility of knowing in advance that the collapse of the system is approaching. The model discussed in Ref. 20) , similar in spirit to that of Ref. 19) , assumed that the evolution of cascading breakdown was performed on links. They pointed out that the network could freely handle traffic up to some critical average load, above which the network faces partial congestions that start to build up local bottlenecks in various places and small instabilities might trigger macroscopic outages with a finite probability. By assuming the load on a node to be the total amount of packets passing through that node per unit of time, Refs. 10)-13) show that intentional attacks can lead to the entire or a substantial part of the network to collapse while a random attack can hardly destroy the network system.
These models proposed so far, however, do not take into account the fact that capacities are not identical for all links in the network and the distribution of packet loads on links is not completely random. Links between big power plants, for example, can indeed afford heavier power flows per unit of time while only light power flows are allowed between small power plants in case of possible occurrence of blackouts. Furthermore, big power plants have more chances to send or receive power flows which could lead to the fact that links adjacent to big power plants will afford larger quantities rather than completely random quantities of power flows. §2.
Weighted network model
Weighted network model provides a good method to describe the diversity of link capacities for packet flows. In unweighted networks, all the links are binary with values being either 1 or 0, but in weighted networks, different link weights represent different interaction strengths between nodes. In power transmission network, for instance, different weights mean different capacities for power flows. By far there have been several weighted network models with different evolving mechanisms, see e.g. Refs. 14) and 15). In our study we adopt the traffic-driven evolution model of undirected weighted technological networks, 15) which gives power-law distributions of degree, weight, and strength, as can be observed in many real networks. 16) , 17) The model reveals some very important properties of technological networks, on which cascading failures usually happen. Disassortative mixing of degrees, 18) for instance, which is revealed by the model, is one of the most important properties of technological networks. The model starts from an initial configuration of N 0 nodes connected by links with assigned weight w 0 and is defined according to the following rules: (i) Strength dynamics -From the beginning of the evolution, all the possible connections (existing or not) update their weights according to the following strengthcoupling rule: 15) w ij → w ij + 1, with probability Mp ij , w ij , with probability 1
where M is a positive constant control parameter, and w ij is the weight of the link connecting nodes i and j.
where s i is the strength of node i, which is defined as 17)
where the sum runs over the set V (i) of direct neighbors of node i. If Mp ij exceeds one, we assume it to be one.
(ii) Topological growth -At the same step, a new node is added to the network and connected with m existing nodes. Each connection to an existing node i is assured according to the following strength preferential probability:
The weight on each new link is also set to be w 0 . In this weight network evolving model, the control parameters M and m control the total weight growth of the system and the exponent γ of weight distribution P (w) ∼ w −γ . 15) §3. Description of our model
In this paper we propose a simple model aiming at the study of cascading breakdown generated by the redistribution of packet loads by congested links in the trafficdriven evolution weighted network model. In this model, a cascading event is the result of the limiting of flows on a transmission link to its capacity. If packet flows through a link exceed its capacity, the link fails and packet flows on links will redistribute in the network. For simplicity, we do not consider the case that collapse of an link is initialed by weather, operator or device malfunction etc. In detail, in the beginning, links are subjected to a certain amount of packet flows according to the following rule. Flows transmit between N p pairs of nodes along the shortest path connecting each pair. The flows on each shortest path contribute loads on links through which they pass. We calculate loads on links contributed by each pair according to the rule: first we randomly choose a node p 1 from the network and then choose the second node p 2 according to the degree preferential probability:
where G c is the current network. The degree preferential strategy considers the significant importance of large-degree nodes in the network, as can be observed from the important status of big power plants in electric power transmission network and Internet hubs in the Internet. This is the reason why we adopt the degree preferential strategy when choosing the second node. Next we calculate the link loads on the network contributed by the two nodes. An estimate of such load on a link, assuming that the routing takes place following the shortest path, is given by the total number of shortest paths between the two nodes in the network that pass through the link.
If there are more than one shortest path between them, the values of link loads are divided evenly on each shortest path. Using this method the link loads contributed by a pair of nodes are calculated. In the same way, we choose the remaining N p − 1 pairs of nodes and calculate link loads contributed by each pair. After accumulating link loads contributed by each pair, we obtain link loads contributed by all these N p pairs. The N p pairs of nodes are mutually independent and N p is proportional to current network size, i.e. N p = βN c , where N c denotes current network size and β is a positive constant factor. The overall quantity of packet flows f ij on each link E ij is obtained by the multiplication of link load l ij and quantity of unit packet flow a,
Besides, along the quantity of packet flows, we associate to each link E ij the capacity C ij equal to its weight w ij . The dynamics of the cascading breakdown model is defined by a simple threshold process. If the total flows f ij carried by a link E ij exceed the links's capacity C ij , the link collapses and is removed away from the network. In this study, we explore the relationship between the degree of damage and quantity of unit flow a on different weighted networks. The damage caused by a cascade is quantified in terms of the relative size R of final giant component,
where N f is the size of the final giant component when all the links support flows lower than their security thresholds. In our simulations, a weighted network G(0) is first generated according to the traffic-driven evolution model introduced above. The propagation of the cascade corresponds to
, where t f denotes the final time step when the cascade process terminates and G(t) denotes the network at time step t. Results for various values of a are obtained in our study.
We have performed large-scale numerical simulations by applying repeatedly the rules stated above on traffic-driven weighted network model. The sizes of the networks in our simulations range from N =500 nodes to N =1000 nodes. The parameters w 0 , N 0 and m in traffic-driven network model are set to be 1, 3 and 3 respectively and the constant factor β is set to be 10. All numerical results were obtained by averaging over 15 different network configurations and, at least, 50 different realizations of cascading breakdown process for each network configuration. Now we present numerical simulations of our model concerning cascading breakdown on weighted complex network. The main plots in Fig. 1 show the relative size R of final giant component as a function of the quantity of unit packet flow a ranging from 10 −3 to 2×10 −2 for weighted networks with control parameter M =0.5, 2, 5 and 30 respectively. At low values of the quantity of unit flow a, networks have the sizes of final giant components of the order of system size. When gradually increasing a, networks begin to develop instabilities. It can be seen that R grows when increasing the control parameter M in network model, which is due to the fact that link weights, i.e. link capacities, can increase with larger probabilities when the parameter M is larger. We can also find that the size of final giant component scales with system size. Networks with larger sizes present heavier destruction by packet flows if they are subjected to equal value of a and they are less robust to packet flows. The result implies that with the growing of network size, vigilance for possible occurrences of cascading breakdown should be more sharpened.
In the inset plots of Fig. 1 , the asterisks represent the final relative size of giant component while the circles denote the relative size of giant component (1) , where N 1 is the size of the giant component of G (1) . In each inset plot, the upright dotted line passes through the point where R 1 begins to decay from nearly one so that we can approximately evaluate relative size R of final network from the point where the dotted line and the line R ∼ a intersect. The inset plots indicate that networks with lower values of M is more resilient to breakdown. As M increases, the size of the final giant component decays less abruptly and catastrophically. In addition, more importantly from a practical point of view, the precursory activity is less intensive as M grows. We can see from the inset of Fig. 1(a) for the case with M = 0.5, that the final relative size R of giant component has dropped below 0.1 when G 1 begins to lose the integrity of original network G 0 . This is the unwanted case because any potential instability will easily propagate until the complete fragmentation of networks. Contrarily, R still holds the value around 1/2 for the case with M = 30, as can be seen from the inset of Fig. 1(d) . In this case potential instabilities destroy the network less heavily. Practically, as cascading failures on complex networks are fast processes, it is therefore very difficult to take defensive measures once cascading breakdown breaks out immediately. In real lives, potential instability in the network can hardly be predicted very precisely, which motivates people to construct more robust networks. In fact, the relative size of final largest giant component R is a phase-transition process as the quantity of unit packet flow a is increased. The transition in the main plot of Fig. 1(a) is characterized by a sudden jump in the final largest giant component R. Both R and the derivative of R as a function of the quantity of unit packet flow a are discontinuous at some points. Therefore the transition resembles a first-order phase transition. Comparatively, the values of R in the main plots of Fig. 1(b) , (c) and (d) are continuous while their derivatives are discontinuous at some point a . Therefore they have the characteristic properties of a second-order phase transition.
The distributions of link loads and link weights on different networks might help us reveal the reason that different networks exhibit different robustness against packet flows. In Fig. 2 we show the average link load l k 1 k 2 and the average link weight w k 1 k 2 as a function of k 1 and k 2 in 3-dimensional coordinates, which are denoted as the degrees of nodes adjacent to a link for two weighted networks with M = 0.5 and 30 respectively. Each plot is the result of average over 500 different network configurations. Figure 2 (a) and (d) portray the average link load for each k 1 -k 2 pair for cases with M = 0.5 and 30 respectively. We find that links with large loads usually possess large-degree nodes on both sides (hereafter we will call these links core-links because they usually play an important role in flow transmission process). The fact might be accounted for the reasons that large-degree nodes usually have more chances to send or receive packets and a shortest path between two nodes is easier to pass through large-degree nodes. Figure 2 (b) and (e) portray the average link weight for each k 1 -k 2 pair for cases with M = 0.5 and 30 respectively. We find core-links also have larger weights. The results coincide with the observations in real life networks. Transmission lines (links) between two big power plants in power transmission networks, for instance, are usually endowed with larger capacities for power flows. In order to find out the links that collapse more easily, we define the ratio
. According to our model, it is easy to see that in a given network, links with larger q can bear heavier packet flows. For the network with large value of M , as Fig. 2(f) (M = 30) shows, the values of q are smaller for links adjacent to low-degree and mid-degree nodes, which indicates that in such weighted networks, people should not ignore strengthening weights on links adjacent to low-degree and mid-degree nodes while adopting weight preferential strategy in network evolving process. When M is small, as is shown in Fig. 2(c) for M = 0.5, however, we find that core-links are easier to collapse. In this case, people should pay more attention to possible failures on core-links to avoid the occurrence of abrupt large-scale cascading breakdown. After comparison we conclude that by employing weight preferential strengthening strategy, increasing velocities of weights on core-links are much higher than that of weights on links adjacent to lowdegree and mid-degree nodes, which can avoid terrible and abrupt catastrophe on complex networks. Furthermore, we have also explored the effects to cascading breakdown brought by the changing of parameter m. In Fig. 3 , we show that the relative size of final largest giant component R decreases with the increasing of m. As Ref. 15 ) mentioned, smaller m results in larger dispersion of nodes' strengths. The experiment reveals that networks with smaller dispersion of nodes' strengths can lead to heavier destruction by cascading failures.
In real life networks such as electric power transmission network and the Internet, it is necessary to increase link capacities in case of abrupt overloading on links by heavy packet flows. However, because of limited resources such as financial cost and manpower, it is advisable to utilize these resources more efficiently. According to weighted network evolving model mentioned in Ref. 17 ), a larger M will deduce a larger dispersion of weights on networks, i.e. higher degree of heterogeneity in weight distribution. This is because links with larger weights are more inclined to be strengthened in network evolving process, as compared to the ones with smaller weights. After an analysis of our model, we conclude that weight preferential strengthening strategy provides an efficient and economical way to lighten the abruptness of possible catastrophic cascading breakdown because of the significant importance of core-links in the network. For earlier (or undeveloped) networks, i.e. cases with small values of M , collapse of a small fraction of core-links can lead to a heavy loss of network's integrity. Developed networks (i.e. networks with larger values of M ) are no longer as sensitive to the increasing packet flows as earlier (or undeveloped) networks because the most fragile links are those adjacent to low-degree and mid-degree nodes. Therefore, weight preferential strategy can enhance network's robustness against the threat brought by large-scale cascading breakdown. Besides, our study can also shed people more lights on designing efficient prevention strategies from cascading breakdown on real life networks. We should not ignore strengthening weights of links connecting low-degree and mid-degree nodes in networks while adopting weight preferential strengthening strategy for developed networks, for instance. §5.
Conclusion and outlook
In conclusion, we have defined a model for the evolution of cascading breakdown on weighted scale-free complex network, which can especially well describe the electric power transmission system blackouts and the Internet congestion. In this model, a parameter M is introduced to control weight strengthening velocities when new nodes are continually added to weighted network. The capacity for packet flows on each link is represented by the link's weight and the load carried by each link is defined according to the consideration that some hub nodes play a very important role in packet flow transmission process in the network. When the quantity of flows through a link has exceeded its capacity, the link is overloaded and collapses. For early or undeveloped networks, corresponding to cases with small M , core-links, i.e. links adjacent to large-degree nodes, are much easier to collapse. Collapse of only a few core-links can abruptly lead to a large scale loss of the network's integrity. As M is growing, the most fragile parts gradually switch to links adjacent to low-degree and mid-degree nodes, which efficiently alleviate the abruptness of cascading breakdown in the network. Due to limited financial and manpower cost, for developed networks, however, it is much wiser to strengthen weights of links using strategies with the best trade-off between weight preferential strategy and strengthening the most fragile links. It is a further challenge for us all to find out methods with the best trade-off when strengthening link weights in networks. We hope that our work will provide some hints for accurate modelling of power system blackouts and the Internet congestion.
Besides, the characteristic degree exponents of scale-free network may change the effects of cascading breakdown on weighted network. We will further discuss this problem in our following research.
